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El-Zein: Embry-Uh-Oh

NOTE
Embry-Uh-Oh: An Alternative Approach to
Frozen Embryo Disputes
Anna El-Zein*

I. INTRODUCTION
How can two cells – a sperm and an egg – generate so many issues? Consider this example: a couple has difficulty bearing children without medical
assistance,1 so they embark on the journey of in vitro fertilization (“IVF”).
IVF, one of many forms of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”),2 is a
fertilization process wherein an egg and sperm cell are manually combined and
implanted into the uterus of a female donor or surrogate.3 After visiting a fertility clinic,4 the couple decides to proceed with IVF and to cryopreserve, or

*

B.A., Truman State University, 2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2018; Senior Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018. I would
like to extend a special thank you to Associate Dean Paul Litton and the entire Missouri
Law Review staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note.
1. Couples dealing with fertility issues are not uncommon. Of women aged fifteen to forty-four, over ten percent have received fertility services at some point in their
lives. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT 3 (2015),
ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/ART-2013-Clinic-Report-Full.pdf.
2. See In Vitro Fertilization: IFV, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, http://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/in-vitro-fertilization/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2017).
3. Id.
4. In 2014, there were 458 reporting fertility clinics in the United States that performed ART procedures. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note
1, at 4.
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freeze, unused embryos5 to ease the IVF process should they attempt procreation again in the future.6 Generally, the fertility clinic asks the couple to sign
a contract – called a cryopreservation consent form – to determine the fate of
their embryos in case of death, divorce, or other change in circumstance.7
Sometimes situations do change, and it is at this critical juncture – when
donors have established their embryos’ destiny but circumstances are not provided for via contract – where disputes arise and the law crumbles.8 Suppose
a couple divorces and the woman wants to implant the embryos against the
man’s wishes; should a court be allowed to make that type of decision? Alternatively, should a court be permitted to order disposal of the embryos or have
the power to force the couple to give the embryos to research? Should a court
deem the frozen embryos “life” or “persons,” and if so, determine whether they
have protectable constitutional rights?9 To date, only a handful of states have
5. This Note will use the term “embryo” to simplify the more precise term of
“pre-embryo.” For a brief scientific background, and an interesting moral discussion,
see Howard W. Jones, Jr. & Charlotte Schrader, And Just What Is a Pre-Embryo?, 52 FERTILITY & STERILITY 189 (1989) (available at http://www.fertstert.org/article/S0015-0282(16)60840-3/pdf). A “pre-embryo” is generally considered a fertilized egg within fourteen days of fertilization. Id. at 189. Before these fourteen days
are completed, the pre-embryo lacks “the appearance of a single primitive streak”
which establishes the group of cells as an individual human. Id. at 190. Before this
time, the pre-embryo could still become twins or may not develop at all. Id. The term
“embryo” in this Note will be used to encompass all forms of in vitro (taking place
outside a living organism) pre-embryos prior to implantation in the uterus.
6. John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 407, 408 (1990). Cryopreservation allows embryos to be preserved for
many years. See How Do Embryos Survive the Freezing Process?, SCI. AM.,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-do-embryos-survive-th/ (last visited
Sept. 7, 2017). In cases where the donor and embryo carrier are the same woman,
freezing embryos also will “relieve the woman of the physical burden and costs of undergoing ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval during later attempts at IVF pregnancy.”
Robertson, supra. Further, cryopreservation enhances “the chances of pregnancy in
later cycles since thawed embryos will be placed in the woman during a natural cycle,
free of the stimulating drugs and surgical intrusion.” Robertson, supra; see also How
Do Embryos Survive the Freezing Process?, supra.
7. A cryopreservation agreement is a contract offered by fertility clinics designating the terms and agreement between a couple and the fertility clinic. Robertson,
supra note 6, at 409–10. The form also allows couples to provide for the embryos’
disposition in the event of death, divorce, or other change in circumstance. Id. at 410.
For example, common embryo dispositions include donating the embryos to research,
discarding the embryos, donating embryos to infertile couples, or awarding embryos to
one of the parties. Id.
8. See Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An
Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 56
(1999).
9. Most courts have refused to recognize, or even address, whether frozen embryos are life. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 271 (Wash. 2002) (en banc) (“It
is not necessary for this court to engage in a legal, medical or philosophical discussion
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addressed the issue of frozen embryo disposition,10 and fewer states have enacted legislation to help courts navigate questions of the protectable interests
of embryos, contract interpretation in this setting, and constitutional procreation rights.11
In Part II, this Note addresses the general background of domestic and
international case law and legislation surrounding embryonic disputes. Part III
then examines recent case law developments; specifically, it discusses the only
existing frozen embryo dispute in Missouri.12 Finally, Part IV offers a suggested approach for courts to use when addressing these increasingly complex
cases.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Although a relatively new concern, frozen embryo disputes have generated a sizeable amount of case law outside of Missouri. Section A of this Part
discusses the various approaches state courts use in determining the appropriate disposition of frozen embryos when a couple divorces or separates. Section
B then discusses the few state statutes that bind courts when navigating embryonic disputes. Finally, Section C addresses scholars’ recommendations, as well
as international methods for avoiding frozen embryo disputes.

whether the preembryos in this case are ‘children . . . .’”). But see Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (“We conclude that preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to
special respect because of their potential for human life.”); Jones & Schrader, supra
note 5, at 191 (“[T]he pre-embryo deserves to be treated as a special bit of humanity . .
. [but] it cannot have the moral equivalent of an adult . . . . This requires the establishment of special rules for its place in society. This niche is different from those of the
egg, sperm and the fertilizing egg on the one hand and from the niches of the embryo,
fetus, and infant on the other.”).
10. Courts have generally used the term “disposition” to encompass the fate of an
embryo after an event provided for by contract, such as death, divorce, or separation.
See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590. The list of states that have addressed frozen embryo
disposition includes, at least: Illinois in Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1154
(Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Massachusetts in A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass.
2000); Missouri in McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); New
Jersey in J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 720 (N.J. 2001); New York in Kass v. Kass, 696
N.E.2d 174, 178 (N.Y. 1998); Oregon in In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d
834, 840–41 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Pennsylvania in Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1137
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); Tennessee in Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604; Texas in Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 49–50 (Tex. App. 2006); and Washington in Litowitz, 48 P.3d at
269.
11. See MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.015(9) (2016);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (2017); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (2017).
12. See McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 127.
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A. Methods State Courts Use to Determine Frozen Embryo Disposition
The United States Supreme Court has yet to address issues arising out of
IVF procreation.13 Without explicit direction, state courts are left to decide
these complex issues, dealing with their citizens’ most private concerns, on
their own. Most courts have taken one of three approaches: the balancing interests approach, the contractual approach, or the contemporaneous mutual assent approach.14

1. The Balancing Interests Approach
The balancing interests approach seeks to resolve embryonic disputes by
“consider[ing] the positions of the parties, the significance of their interests,
and the relative burdens that will be imposed by differing resolutions.”15
In 1992, the Tennessee Supreme Court became the first major appellate
court to consider embryo disposition issues.16 In Davis v. Davis, a divorced
couple disputed the custody of their frozen embryos.17 Without any type of
agreement or consent form completed during the IVF process, the court was
left to “weigh the interests of each party to the dispute . . . in order to resolve
that dispute in a fair and responsible manner.”18 The woman wanted to donate
the embryos to another couple, while the man opposed donation and wished to
discard the embryos.19
The court held that disputes over the disposition of embryos should honor
the parties’ wishes.20 However, if no agreement memorializing the parties’
wishes exists (as was the case here), the court should weigh the interests of the
parties.21 Balancing the parties’ interests, the court found the man’s interest in
preventing the birth of embryos created from his sperm outweighed the
woman’s interest in donating the embryos.22 Where a woman has a reasonable
alternative to achieving parenthood, as the court found was the case here,23 the
court concluded “the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail.”24 The
13.
14.
15.
16.

Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
See Coleman, supra note 8, at 57–58.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603.
Id. at 590 (“[W]e have no statutory authority or common law precedents to
guide us . . . .”).
17. See id. at 592.
18. Id. at 591–92 (“There was no discussion, let alone an agreement, concerning
disposition in the event of a contingency such as divorce.”).
19. Id. at 604.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (“The case would be closer if [the woman] were seeking to use the
preembryos herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood by any other reasonable means.”).
24. Id.
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court ruled in favor of the man, and the fertility clinic proceeded with its protocol for unused embryos.25
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Reber v. Reiss also used the balancing interests approach but reached a different outcome than did the Davis
court.26 In Reber, a man appealed a Pennsylvania trial court’s decision, which
awarded embryos to his cancer-ridden ex-wife.27 As in Davis, the couple in
Reber had not signed a consent form prior to the IVF procedures.28 Applying
the balancing interests approach, the court found that the woman’s compelling
interest in using the embryos for “what is likely her only chance at genetic
parenthood” outweighed the man’s interests in not procreating.29 Consequently, the court awarded the embryos to the woman.30
Unlike the previously mentioned frozen embryo disputes, J.B. v. M.B. involved a man seeking ownership of the couples’ embryos so that he could implant the embryos into a surrogate or donate them to another couple.31 The
woman, though, wanted to discard the frozen embryos after the couple divorced.32 Although the couple had entered into an agreement before proceeding with IVF procedures, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that enforcing contracts to enter or terminate familial relations violates New Jersey public
policy.33 Accordingly, the court did not look to the couple’s agreement to determine the disposition of the frozen embryos.34 Instead, the court balanced
the interests of the parties and ultimately found the woman’s interest in not
procreating outweighed the man’s interest in procreating because he was “able
to become a father to additional children, whether through natural procreation
or further in vitro fertilization.”35
In sum, courts using the balancing approach disregard existing contracts
and instead weigh one party’s interest in having a child against the burden to
the other of unwillingly becoming a parent.36 The courts have typically not
25. If frozen embryos remain unused, a fertility clinic will usually discard the embryos after a certain period of time. See id. at 604–05.
26. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1136, 1142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
27. Id. at 1133–34.
28. Id. at 1136.
29. Id. at 1140, 1142.
30. Id. at 1142.
31. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 710 (N.J. 2001).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 717–20 (“The public policy concerns that underlie limitations on contracts involving family relationships are protected by permitting either party to object
at a later date to provisions specifying a disposition of preembryos that that party no
longer accepts.”).
34. Id. at 719–20.
35. Id. at 717.
36. See, e.g., id. at 719 (recognizing that “persuasive reasons exist for enforcing
preembryo disposition agreements” but concluding that “if there is disagreement as to
disposition because one party has reconsidered his or her earlier decision, the interests
of both parties must be evaluated”).
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allowed one party to force another to become a parent, with one exception.37
Courts have allowed parties to use frozen embryos against their counterpart’s
wishes when a woman lacks the ability to have children without the use of the
embryos.38

2. The Contractual Approach
Courts using the contractual approach generally presume that an agreement made between the parties at the time of IVF is valid and enforceable.39
This approach attempts to avoid costly litigation and leaves such private decisions to the interested parties rather than the courts.40
In Kass v. Kass, the New York Court of Appeals applied the contractual
approach to determine whether a cryopreservation agreement between a man
and woman should be enforced.41 The parties agreed that if they were unable
to reach a mutually-satisfactory decision as to the disposition of the embryos,
the embryos would be given to an IVF program for research.42 The couple
divorced, and despite this agreement, the lower court granted custody of the
embryos to the woman, reasoning that “a female participant in the IVF procedure has exclusive decisional authority over the fertilized eggs created through
that process, just as a pregnant woman has exclusive decisional authority over
a nonviable fetus.”43 However, the state’s highest court found the parties “unequivocally manifest[ed] their mutual intention that . . . the pre-zygotes be donated for research to the IVF program” and ultimately honored the parties’
original contract.44
In Litowitz v. Litowitz, a husband and wife signed a cryopreservation consent form that stated “[i]n the event [the Litowitzes] are unable to reach a mutual decision regarding the disposition of [their] pre-embryos, [they] must petition to a [c]ourt of competent jurisdiction for instructions concerning the appropriate disposition of [their] pre-embryos.”45 Upon divorcing, the man
37. See, e.g., id. at 717; Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)
(recognizing the principle and applying its single exception); Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing the impact of “unwanted parenthood”
on a party).
38. Reber, 42 A.3d at 1142.
39. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
40. Id.; Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
41. Kass, 696 N.E.2d. at 180–82.
42. Id. at 176–77.
43. Id. at 177.
44. Id. at 181; accord In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 840 (Or. Ct.
App. 2008) (“We conclude that the general framework set forth by the courts in Davis
and Kass, in which courts give effect to the progenitors’ intent by enforcing the progenitors’ advance directive regarding the embryos, is persuasive.”). The Kass court
uses the term “pre-zygotes” which it defines as “eggs which have been penetrated by
sperm but have not yet joined genetic material.” Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175 n.1.
45. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 263 (Wash. 2002) (en banc).
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wished to place the embryos up for adoption, while the woman hoped to implant the embryos inside her to pursue pregnancy.46 Yet, neither party was
satisfied because the Washington Supreme Court honored a provision in the
couple’s contract that stated the eggs were to be thawed out (and eventually
destroyed) but not allowed to be further developed after the pre-embryos had
been in cryopreservation for five years.47
Most recently, in Szafranski v. Dunston, the Illinois Appellate Court used
the contractual approach where an ex-boyfriend and ex-girlfriend were fighting
over their frozen embryos.48 After the couple’s separation,49 the woman hoped
to implant the embryos within her.50 She argued that in the event of separation,
the contract previously entered into by the parties gave her full custody of the
embryos.51 In the alternative, she asked the court to balance the parties’ interests and award her custody.52 Meanwhile, the man asserted his right not to
procreate and requested the court prevent her from implanting the embryos.53
Ultimately, the court in Szafranski held the dispute should be settled by
“honoring any advance agreement entered into by the parties” but agreed to use
the balancing interests approach if no agreement existed.54 Applying this
framework, the court ignored the written consent form, which stated it would
take no action without the parties’ mutual consent, and found the couple had
previously entered into an oral contract.55 The court awarded the woman sole
custody and use of the embryos.56 The court also acknowledged that, even in

46. Id. at 264.
47. Id. at 271. Five years had passed during the course of the litigation, but the

contract was not amended during that time. See id. at 268–69. But see id. at 273 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (“That by today more than five years has passed since the cryopreservation commenced is irrelevant because the judicial action which provided for the
disposition of the preembryos was commenced well within the five-year window
thereby tolling the contracted period of limitations.”).
48. Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1136 (Ill. Ct. App. 2015).
49. Id. at 1140 (“Jacob ended their relationship in a text message.”).
50. Id. at 1136; see also Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 505 (Ill. Ct. App.
2013) (“Appellee attached to her motion a letter from [a doctor] stating that appellee
has ovarian failure as a result of her chemotherapy treatment which has ‘rendered [her]
unable to conceive a child with the use of her own oocytes.’” (second alteration in
original)).
51. Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1137.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 1147.
55. Id. at 1138, 1151–52 (“Karla told Jacob that the plan was to retrieve a large
number of eggs, fertilize a portion, and then freeze the resulting pre-embryos while she
underwent her chemotherapy treatment. Karla asked if he would ‘be willing to provide
sperm to make pre-embryos with her.’ He responded ‘yes,’ telling Karla that he wanted
to help her have a child.”).
56. Id. at 1137.
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the absence of an oral or written contract, the court would have still found for
the woman under the balancing interests test.57

3. The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach
The contemporaneous mutual consent approach suggests “no embryo
should be used by either partner, donated to another patient, used in research,
or destroyed without the [contemporaneous] mutual consent of the couple that
created the embryo.”58 In practice, this approach allows the parties to create a
contract and modify that agreement with both parties’ consent.59 Both parties
must agree before a court will allow either party to use embryos.
In A.Z. v. B.Z., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered the
disposition of embryos created by a couple who signed a consent form designating the embryos to the woman for implantation in the event the couple became “separated.”60 Unlike previous decisions, A.Z. looked to the intention of
the consent form, which the court found to merely “define the donors’ relationship as a unit with the clinic.”61 The court further devalued the consent form
because it lacked a durational provision, and the term “separation” was legally
distinct from “divorce.”62
For these reasons, the court in A.Z. refused to honor the parties’ IVF consent form.63 The court also stated that even if the consent form were legally
sufficient, it would not be enforced for public policy reasons.64 It found that
agreements to enter into marriage or parenthood “should not be enforced
against individuals who subsequently reconsider their decisions” – here, the
man, who now objected to the woman’s use of the embryos.65 Instead, in order
for one of the parties to use the embryos over the objection of the other, the
court required contemporaneous mutual consent.66 Stated differently, because
the woman wanted to use the parties’ embryos but her partner now objected,

57. Id. at 1137, 1147 (“Karla’s desire to have a biological child in the face of the
impossibility of having one without using the embryos, outweighs Jacob’s privacy concerns . . . and his speculative concern that he might not find love with a woman because
he unhesitatingly agreed to help give Karla her last opportunity to fulfill her wish to
have a biological child.”).
58. Coleman, supra note 8, at 110; see also Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d
502, 510 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013) (exemplifying the issues of contractual assent).
59. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
60. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (Mass. 2000).
61. Id. at 1056.
62. Id. at 1057.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1057–58 (“As a matter of public policy, we conclude that forced procreation is not an area amenable to judicial enforcement.”).
65. Id. at 1059.
66. Id.; see Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic
Consent Forms Are Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 57, 59 (2011).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/16

8

El-Zein: Embry-Uh-Oh

2017]

EMBRY-UH-OH: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

889

the woman would need to change her partner’s mind before she would be entitled to use the embryos. Because mutual consent did not exist, the court refused to allow the woman to implant the frozen embryos against the man’s
wishes.67
Although these three methods of resolving the disposition of frozen embryos have given courts guidance, some states have enacted legislation to prevent litigation from reaching the courts.

B. State Legislation Addressing Frozen Embryos
Although no Missouri statute directly addresses embryonic disputes, two
Missouri statutes attempt to define the point at which “life” begins. Section
1.205 of the Missouri Revised Statutes notes, “[L]ife of each human being begins at conception.”68 It continues, “[T]he term ‘unborn children’ or ‘unborn
child’ shall include all unborn child or children or the offspring of human beings from the moment of conception until birth at every stage of biological development.”69 In addition, section 188.015 reiterates that life begins “from the
moment of conception until birth and at every stage of its biological development, including . . . embryo[s].”70 This language suggests that an embryo, as
the fruit of conception, is life with protectable interests.71 Yet, ambiguity remains because the statutes repeatedly reference “biological development,” and
freezing an embryo likely halts its biological development.
Other states have gone further. In anticipating complex legal issues surrounding embryonic disputes, some states have created statutes that attempt to
define “embryo” or that direct those couples who go through IVF procedures
to take appropriate action in order to prevent later disputes.72 In Florida, a
couple seeking cryopreservation of embryos “shall enter into a written agreement that provides for the disposition of the commissioning couple’s . . .
preembryos in the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen circumstance.”73 If no agreement exists, Florida has designated that

A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059.
MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205(1) (2016) (emphasis added).
Id. at § 1.205(3) (bold in original) (emphasis added).
MO. REV. STAT. § 188.015(9) (2016) (emphasis added). Section (10) continues, “‘Viability’ ‘or ‘viable’, that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial lifesupportive systems.” Id. at § 188.015(10) (bold in original).
71. McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 140 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); MO. REV.
STAT. § 1.205(1)(2) (2016) (“Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health,
and well-being . . . .”); see also Brief for Appellant at 1, McQueen v. Gadberry, 507
S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (No. ED103138), 2015 WL 9582009, at *1 (arguing
same). In addition, an embryo that is deemed life will receive legal protection through
an appointed guardian ad litem. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.423(1) (2016).
72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (2017).
73. § 742.17.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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decision-making authority should “reside jointly with the . . . couple.”74 Florida’s statute effectively acts as a method of contemporaneous mutual consent
because it encourages couples to enter into a pre-agreement and does not allow
one party to act unilaterally.75
The New Hampshire legislature enacted a bill mandating that, before an
embryonic transfer procedure, the potential parents must “make guardianship
provisions for the prospective child by amending their existing estate planning
documents, or by executing estate planning documents . . . if they have no existing estate planning documents.”76 Further, couples must go through medical
examinations and counseling before embryonic transfer.77 This law encourages parties to plan for the future of their prospective child.
In 1986, Louisiana enacted a statute designating that “[a] ‘human embryo’
. . . is an in vitro fertilized human ovum, with certain rights granted by law,
composed of one or more living human cells and human genetic material so
unified and organized that it will develop in utero into an unborn child.”78
Courts interpret this statute to mean that an embryo is a “juridical person” that
must be implanted and cannot be discarded.79

C. International Methods and Alternative Approaches
The United States is not alone in dealing with frozen embryo disputes.
Across the globe, Italy was once considered the “Wild West” of alternative
reproduction technologies.80 Italian doctors dabbled in cloning, race selection,
and IVF treatment on women well-beyond childbearing age.81 In 2004, Italy
passed the Regulation of Medically Assisted Reproduction law, largely in response to religious pressure.82 The law shifted the country from a “completely

74.
75.
76.
77.

§ 742.17(2).
§ 742.17.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (2017).
See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178 (N.Y. 1998) (interpreting New Hampshire statutes to require couples to “undergo medical exams and counseling”); see also
A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Mass. 2000) (same); Roman v. Roman, 193
S.W.3d 40, 44 n.6 (Tex. App. 2006) (same).
78. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (2017).
79. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178; A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1055; Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 44
n.6; In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 841 n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). A
“juridical person” is an entity that is not a natural person but has legal rights and obligations recognized by the law. What Is a Juridical Person?, L. DICTIONARY,
http://thelawdictionary.org/juridical-person/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2017).
80. Morgan De Ann Shields, Comment, Which Came First the Cost or the Embryo? An Economic Argument for Disallowing Cryopreservation of Human Embryos,
9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 685, 712 (2013).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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unregulated IVF regime to [having] some of the harshest restrictions worldwide.”83 The law prohibits the freezing of embryos, allows only three embryos
to be fertilized and implanted at a time, and forbids posthumous IVF treatment.84 Proponents of the law claim it is an effective means of protecting
women from risky procedures and potential health risks associated with multiple pregnancies.85 However, opponents of the law argue it effectively halts
scientific development, promotes “infertility tourism” to neighboring countries, and “assign[s] a higher value to protection of embryos than to the interests
of infertile women.”86
In response to historical Nazi abuse, Germany passed The Embryo Protection Act of 1990 to protect against “violations of humanity.”87 While couples are still permitted to participate in IVF treatments, the act heavily regulates
the creation, preservation, and destruction of embryos.88 The act prescribes
only three embryos may be created and implanted at one time, prohibits posthumous procreation, and bars embryonic cryopreservation.89 Such limitations
were designed to prevent the recurrence of medical abuses undertaken during
the Nazi era, as well as to protect women from multiple gestations and accompanying pregnancy complications.90 In a sense, the act attempts to balance the
83. Id. (“Before this Law was passed, Italy had the most unregulated ART industry
in Europe.”).
84. Id.; Mary Rodgers Bundren, The Influence of Catholicism, Islam and Judaism
on the Assisted Reproductive Technologies (“Art”) Bioethical and Legal Debate: A
Comparative Survey of Art in Italy, Egypt and Israel, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 715,
732 (2007).
85. See Bundren, supra note 84, at 730–33.
86. Id. at 733 (“Because abortion is still legal in Italy, aborting a fetus at sixteenweeks gestation is tolerated; however, dropping an embryo culture dish in the laboratory may be considered homicide.”). The term “infertility tourism” refers to travel due
to differences in cost, decreased administrative barriers, or other treatments prohibited
by a person’s own country. Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 295, 303–04 (2005).
87. Shields, supra note 80, at 709–10 (quoting Tanja Krones, The Scope of the
Recent Bioethics Debate in Germany: Kant, Crisis, and No Confidence in Society, 15
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 273, 277 (2006)). Shields writes,
Germans[] have, due to our history of Nazi Germany, a high sensitivity and fear
of making horrible mistakes again. Therefore, we have to be exceedingly suspicious and cautious with regard to developments that might have the potential
for violating human dignity in our society Only strict legislation, such as the
E[mbryo] P[rotection] A[ct], rooted in our Constitution, offers protection
against violations of humanity.

Id. at 710 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Krones, supra, at
710).
88. Id. at 709.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 710; John A. Robertson, Reproductive Technology in Germany and the
United States: An Essay in Comparative Law and Bioethics, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
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woman’s interest in having a child with the state’s interest in preventing multiple gestations for its citizens.91
One scholar has argued that the United States should follow Italy and
Germany by prohibiting cryopreservation of embryos altogether.92 By enacting legislation that bans cryopreservation, litigation would subside, IVF procedures would be standardized, and costs associated with IVF procedures and
resulting births would be reduced.93 Regardless, litigation surrounding IVF
and frozen embryo disputes presents difficult issues for courts across the country and worldwide. The Missouri courts have avoided such controversies –
until now.94

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In Missouri, case law regarding embryonic disposition is scant. However,
in November 2016, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, addressed
a dispute over frozen embryos in McQueen v. Gadberry.95 As a case of first
impression, McQueen v. Gadberry will undoubtedly direct future litigation on
artificial reproductive technologies and may pressure the Missouri legislature
to enact legislation relating to these issues. Part A of this section explains the
relevant facts surrounding the dispute and each party’s arguments on appeal.
Part B discusses the analysis and holding of McQueen v. Gadberry and its implications for Missouri jurisprudence.

A. Relevant Facts
Jalesia McQueen and Justin Gadberry were married in September 2005.96
In early 2007, while Gadberry was stationed at a North Carolina military base,
four embryos were created after the couple underwent IVF procedures.97 Two
of the embryos were successfully implanted, and McQueen eventually gave
birth to twin boys.98 The other two embryos were frozen and remain in storage.99 Later, the couple was forced to move their frozen embryos to another

L. 189, 207 (2004) (“Pregnancies with two or more fetuses carry extra burdens and
substantial health risks for both the woman and the offspring.”).
91. Robertson, supra note 90, at 206.
92. Shields, supra note 80, at 713.
93. Id.
94. McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 133.
97. Id. at 133–34.
98. Id. at 134.
99. Id.
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fertility clinic in Virginia, the Cryobank, at which point they signed an agreement form regarding the disposition of the embryos.100 The form stated that in
the event of divorce, the embryos would be “[u]sed by . . . McQueen.”101
McQueen and Gadberry separated in September 2010.102 The dissolution
of the couple’s marriage proceeded smoothly with one exception – custody of
the two frozen embryos.103 Before the eventual trial, the court appointed a
guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to represent the frozen embryos, an interesting development itself, as this implied the embryos had independent legal rights that
required protection.104 Ultimately, the trial court awarded McQueen and Gadberry joint custody of the embryos, specifically prohibiting any transfer, release, or use of the frozen embryos without the signed authorization of both
McQueen and Gadberry.105 McQueen appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District.106
McQueen maintained three arguments on appeal.107 First, McQueen
claimed Missouri law recognizes embryos, including frozen embryos, as children complete with rights to “life, health and well-being.”108 Consequently,
she sought “custody” of the frozen embryos.109 McQueen argued in the alternative that even if the frozen embryos were considered marital property, she
should be awarded the embryos because the cryopreservation contract was
valid and enforceable against Gadberry.110 Finally, McQueen claimed that the
court-appointed GAL did not fulfill her legal duty to protect the embryos’ best
interest.111
Conversely, Gadberry argued that awarding McQueen the frozen embryos would violate his constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection
and his right not to procreate.112 Gadberry posited the trial court was correct
in characterizing the frozen embryos as marital property and designating that

100. Id. at 135.
101. Id. at 153. Although the specific contract provision is uncontested, Gadberry

argued there was no discussion of the final disposition of the embryos and alleged the
contract was completed outside of Gadberry’s presence. Id. at 155.
102. Id. at 133.
103. Id.
104. Id. (“[T]he trial court . . . apparently sua sponte, appointed a guardian ad litem
(“GAL”) for the frozen pre-embryos.”).
105. Id. at 132.
106. Id. at 127.
107. Id. at 137.
108. Id. at 136 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2000)). The court states, “Missouri
law . . . recognizes an embryo is a person with protectable rights in life, health and wellbeing from the moment of conception onward, unless such protection is barred by the
U.S. Constitution and decisional interpretation thereof.” Id. (citing § 1.205 (2000)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 136–37.
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no transfer, release, or use of the embryos could occur unless the parties
agreed.113

B. The Court’s Analysis and Holdings
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, addressed two main issues in its opinion. First, the court discussed “[w]hether the legislature’s declarations [that life begins at conception/fertilization] constitutionally apply to
frozen pre-embryos and whether frozen pre-embryos should be considered
‘children’ under Missouri’s [marriage] dissolution statutes.”114 Specifically,
the court discussed whether section 1.205 of the Missouri Revised Statutes can
be read in pari materia with Missouri’s statute for marriage dissolution.115
Section 1.205 says, “The life of each human being begins at conception” and
“the term ‘unborn children’ . . . shall include all unborn . . . children . . . from
the moment of conception until birth at every stage of biological development.”116 Further, it states that “[u]nborn children have protectable interests in
life, health, and well-being.”117 However, and crucial to the court’s decision,
section 1.205 also notes that Missouri recognizes unborn children as persons
with protectable interests “subject only to the Constitution of the United States,
and decisional interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme Court.”118
The court accordingly held that “Missouri Courts should read all Missouri statutes in pari materia (harmoniously) with section 1.205 so long as such a reading does not violate a party’s constitutional right afforded to . . . her by the U.S.
Constitution and decisional interpretations thereof by the U.S. Supreme
Court.”119
The court then gave various examples of Missouri case law in which section 1.205 was constitutionally applied to other statutes, demonstrating that it
could be read consistently with constitutional rights.120 For example, the court
113. See id. at 137.
114. Id. at 142.
115. Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2016). Statutes read in pari materia are

generally on the same topic or subject matter and are construed together. What Is In
Pari Materia?, L. DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/in-pari-materia/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2017); Matthew Davis, Note, Statutory Interpretation in Missouri, 81 MO.
L. REV. 1127, 1139 (2016) (“Ambiguous statutory language should be read in light of
separate statutes concerning the same subject matter, more commonly known as statutes in pari materia.”).
116. § 1.205 (bold omitted). McQueen also relied on section 188.015 to further
define the term “unborn.” McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 140; MO. REV. STAT. § 188.015(9)
(2016) (“‘Unborn child’, the offspring of human beings from the moment of conception
until birth and at every stage of its biological development, including the human conceptus, zygote, morula, blastocyst, embryo, and fetus.”).
117. § 1.205.1(2).
118. § 1.205.2.
119. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 142.
120. See id. at 141–43.
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noted section 1.205 has been applied to both civil and criminal statutes against
third parties for allegedly causing the death of an unborn fetus.121 And, cases
applying section 1.205 to other statutes have explicitly held that such an application does not violate Supreme Court precedent – specifically, Roe v. Wade.122
But, the court made a critical distinction: section 1.205 has only been constitutionally applied to other statutes where an unborn fetus is in utero; it has never
been applied where an unborn embryo is in vitro, as was the case here.123 With
this in mind, the court proceeded to question whether reading section 1.205
harmoniously with the Missouri marriage dissolution statues – or, recognizing
in vitro embryos as persons – would violate either party’s constitutional
rights.124
The court used the balancing interests approach to weigh the rights and
interests of McQueen and Gadberry.125 Before addressing the parties’ interests,
the court reiterated that the case considers frozen embryos in vitro, so the issues
presented “[do] not implicate McQueen’s right to bodily integrity in the area
of reproductive choice under Roe [v. Wade] which would outweigh any of Gadberry’s interests in avoiding parenthood.”126 Instead, McQueen and Gadberry
“must be seen as entirely equivalent gamete providers,” each with individual
procreation rights.127
Having determined that McQueen and Gadberry possessed equallyvested rights, the court addressed the relative interests of the parties.128 The
court found McQueen’s necessity to use the frozen embryos to be non-existent.129 The court noted that McQueen did not seek IVF due to fertility issues
but because she and Gadberry were separated geographically.130 Moreover,
McQueen had twin boys as a result of a successful IVF procedure and had

121. Id. at 141; State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Bailey
v. State, 191 S.W.3d 52, 54–55 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
122. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 144; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 504–07 (1989); State v. Holcomb, 956
S.W.2d 286, 289–93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Rollen, 133 S.W.3d 57, 58–64 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2003); Bailey, 191 S.W.3d at 55.
123. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 141; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 120; Webster, 492
U.S. at 504–07; Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d at 289–93; Rollen, 133 S.W.3d at 58–64; Bailey,
191 S.W.3d at 53–54.
124. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 143.
125. Id. at 144. The court first noted that it did not recognize the signed cryopreservation agreement between McQueen and Gadberry as valid and enforceable, for reasons explained below. Id. Because there was not an enforceable contract, the court
used the balancing interests approach. Id.
126. Id. at 145; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 153–54.
127. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 144. A “gamete” is “one of the cells that join together to begin making a person or other creature.” Gamete, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gamete (last visited Sept. 9, 2017).
128. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 145.
129. Id. at 145–46.
130. Id. at 146.
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another child conceived “through traditional means.”131 The court did not find
McQueen’s interests persuasive because her “fundamental right to procreate
would [not] be irrevocably extinguished.”132 To the contrary, the court found
Gadberry’s interests compelling.133 Gadberry did not want to have more children with McQueen, so sustaining her appeal would have essentially made him
a father against his wishes.134 Unlike McQueen’s rights – which were not irrevocably extinguished – if the frozen embryos were successfully implanted
and brought to term, Gadberry’s right not to procreate would be irrevocably
extinguished.135
The court held that the legislature’s intention for embryos to be recognized as persons, as stated in section 1.205, is simply “not sufficient to justify
any infringement upon the freedom and privacy of Gadberry and McQueen to
make their own intimate decisions.”136 In addition, the court held that applying
section 1.205 to Missouri’s marriage dissolution statutes would be “contrary to
U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution” and would
violate Gadberry’s constitutional right to privacy, right against government intrusion, and right not to procreate.137 For these reasons, the court held that
frozen embryos could not be considered “people” with protectable rights under
the law.138
The court next considered whether it was appropriate for the trial court to
classify the frozen embryos as “marital property of a special character.”139 The

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 145.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. In a lengthy and interesting footnote, the court explores potential difficulties with recognizing frozen embryos as persons. Id. at 147 n.21. The court notes,
[I]n the area of criminal law, gamete providers or fertility workers could
possibly be charged with and convicted of various forms of murder and
manslaughter, assault, or child abuse for intentionally or unintentionally
destroying or “injuring” pre-embryos or frozen pre-embryos and for cryogenically preserving pre-embryos and placing them in long-term or indefinite storage. . . . And in the area of civil law, (1) gamete providers or fertility
workers could be sued for wrongful death for destroying pre-embryos or
frozen pre-embryos; and (2) there could be potential problems with a couple
or individuals donating pre-embryos or frozen pre-embryos to others because donation would arguably have to be governed by Missouri’s adoption
statutes . . . which are currently unequipped to regulate such forms of adoption.
Id.
138. Id. at 147–48.
139. Id. at 148.
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court began by noting that property, including marital property, embraces “external thing[s] over which the rights of [] use [] are exercised.”140 According
to the court, frozen embryos are property because they are in vitro, which is
external.141 However, the court recognized that frozen embryos are “special”
and are “entitled to special respect” because they have the potential to become
children.142 Indeed, the frozen embryos were given special respect when the
trial court ordered that they remain cryogenically preserved and stored until the
parties could agree to change the status quo.143 The court noted that this ruling
showed respect because only McQueen and Gadberry should have determinative decision-making authority.144 Consequently, the court held that frozen
embryos are “marital property of a special character.”145
Subsequently, the court addressed McQueen’s arguments in the alternative.146 McQueen argued that even if the frozen embryos are considered property and not humans, she should be awarded the embryos because the cryopreservation agreement, which was in her favor, was valid and enforceable.147 The
court also addressed her claim that it was required to divide all marital property,
including the frozen embryos, between McQueen and Gadberry instead of
awarding them to the couple jointly.148
To begin, the court noted that “[p]roperty acquired during the marriage is
presumed to be marital property, but a party may overcome this presumption
if . . . she shows the property is separate.”149 McQueen claimed that the frozen
embryos could not be jointly owned by her and Gadberry because the embryos
were deemed “separate” by the couple’s cryopreservation agreement.150 Before determining whether the property was “separate,” the court considered the
preliminary question of whether the contract was entered into “freely, fairly,
knowingly, understandingly, and in good faith with full disclosure.”151 The
court eventually answered this question in the negative.152
Supporting its conclusion, the court pointed to several key facts.153 First,
the court highlighted conflicting testimony as to whether McQueen and Gadberry had discussed the potential disposition of their frozen embryos before
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. (quoting Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (7th ed. 1999)).
Id. at 148–49.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 151. The couple’s cryopreservation contract designated that in the case
of separation or divorce, the frozen embryos would be “[u]sed by Jalesia F. McQueen.”
Id. at 153.
148. Id. at 156.
149. Id. at 151 (citing Thorp v. Thorp, 390 S.W.3d 871, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 151–52, 156.
152. Id. at 155–56.
153. Id. at 155.
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signing the agreement.154 The court also found that Gadberry “did not sign the
[contract] with the intent that McQueen be awarded the frozen pre-embryos in
the event of a divorce.”155 Further, it recognized the designation that the frozen
embryos would be “[u]sed by Jalesia F. McQueen” was handwritten in black
ink next to the couple’s initials, which were in blue ink.156 The court found
that this indicated the contract may have been “filled in after Gadberry initialed
the page.”157 The court also noted that the page designating the embryos’ disposition was completed by McQueen and Gadberry six days after the last page
of the agreement, the “signature page,” was signed and notarized.158 For these
reasons, the court held that the contract was unenforceable and that there was
not enough evidence to render the frozen embryos as “separate” property to be
awarded to McQueen.159
Next, the court gave no merit to McQueen’s claim that it was required to
“divide” the frozen embryos and award them to either McQueen or Gadberry.160 Missouri precedent does not preclude courts from awarding marital
property jointly under unusual circumstances, and McQueen and Gadberry’s
circumstances were certainly unusual.161 The court also reiterated its previous
holding that without mutual consent, the frozen embryos were not to be transferred, released, or used by either party precisely because this “subjects neither
party to any unwarranted governmental intrusion but rather leaves the intimate
decision of whether to potentially have more children to the parties alone.”162
Finally, the court cast aside McQueen’s argument that the court-appointed GAL did not fulfill her legal duties to advocate for the interests of the
frozen embryos because “support of children [was] not [a] contested issue[] in
this case.”163 Having already established that frozen embryos are not considered persons, the issue of GAL intervention was effectively moot.164
The court in McQueen v. Gadberry was the first to directly address the
issue of whether frozen embryos are legal persons.165 Its analysis and implications are certain to be tested by other courts in the future.166 Next, Part IV
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 154 (alteration in original).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 156. The court also held that Gadberry did not waive any or all of his
rights to the frozen embryos. Id. at 155.
160. Id. at 156–58.
161. Id. at 157.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 150.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 142.
166. Following the decision in McQueen v. Gadberry, House Bill 2558 was proposed by the Missouri legislature but failed to become law. The bill would have recognized in vitro human embryos as human beings with constitutional rights, directed
the courts to award custody of the embryos based on the embryos’ “best interests,” and
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tackles a different question – how can reproductive donors avoid litigating embryonic disputes altogether?

IV. DISCUSSION
Case law gives rise to a hierarchy of priorities related to embryonic disputes. Courts generally prefer to honor these types of contracts unless a contract allows one party to have a child against the other’s wishes.167 Sometimes
courts disregard a contract and instead rule after balancing the parties’ rights
or requiring the parties to agree.168 Courts have generally found that each donor’s right not to procreate trumps a general interest in having children.169 Yet
when a woman is found to have no other reasonable means of having children
naturally, her right to reproduce typically supersedes the other’s right not to
procreate.170 This Part argues that cryopreservation agreements should be required by state law and enforced by courts; but, because of the stakes involved,
cryopreservation agreements should be presumed enforceable only when parties consult with independent counsel before signing.

A.

Courts Should Honor Contracts to Recognize Couples’ Rights
to Procreate (or Not to)

IVF and other alternative forms of reproduction offer struggling couples
opportunities to have children that they may not have otherwise.171 Given the
private nature of procreation, couples should have the right to control their reproduction choices, and courts should recognize these rights by allowing parties to designate embryonic disposition when certain events occur.172 In order
to maximize a couples’ rights – and minimize the negative consequences of
other approaches – courts should enforce contracts that represent a couples’
designations.173 Without a contract, courts run the risk of improperly

created a presumption that the “best interests” of the embryos were for it to be developed to birth. See H.B. 2558, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016).
167. See, e.g., Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1140–42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); A.Z.
v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000).
168. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 144.
169. Id. at 146–47.
170. See, e.g., Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1162 (Ill. Ct. App. 2015).
171. See Robertson, supra note 6, at 424. Aside from IVF, other alternative forms
of reproduction include artificial insemination, egg or sperm donation, use of a surrogate, zygote intrafallopian transfer, gamete intrafallopian transfer, or intracytoplasmic
sperm injection. See Infertility FAQs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2017).
172. Robertson, supra note 6, at 424.
173. Sara D. Petersen, Comment, Dealing with Cryopreserved Embryos upon Divorce: A Contractual Approach Aimed at Preserving Party Expectations, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 1065, 1082–83 (2003).
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“valu[ing] the reproductive concerns of the persons involved” and imposing
those values on a couple.174
Unfortunately, enforcing a contract as written may mean that a party who
changes his or her mind as to the disposition of the embryos is left unsatisfied.175 But, “[f]reedom to contract or to make directives binding in future
situations enhances liberty even though it involves constraints on what may
occur once the future situation comes about.”176 Enforcing contracts also “provides incentives for the [fertility] clinics themselves to proffer relevant information and well-drafted consent forms that encourage their customers to plan
carefully.”177 If couples realize their contract will be enforced, they are more
likely to “make a thoughtful and informed decision regarding the disposition
of their frozen embryos.”178 On the other hand, if courts inconsistently enforce
agreements, there is little incentive for couples to think carefully about the future disposition of their frozen embryos.179 Today’s environment encourages
litigation, given there is little legislation in this field and courts’ decisions have
resulted in a variety of holdings.180 If, however, courts routinely honor prior
agreements, the time and costs associated with litigation over embryo disputes
will decrease.181 Any concerns about strict enforcement would be unnecessary,
as contract law allows courts to void cryopreservation agreements where certain standards are not met, namely in situations of fraud, mistake, or coercion.182 Finally, due to the sensitive and significant issues involved, courts
should approach agreements with greater skepticism before enforcing an agreement against a donor who later changes his or her wishes.183

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Robertson, supra note 6, at 415.
Id.
Id.
Petersen, supra note 173, at 1084.
Meagan R. Marold, Ice, Ice, Baby! The Division of Frozen Embryos at the
Time of Divorce, 25 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 179, 195 (2014); see also Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211
SCIENCE 453 (1981) (arguing that the framing of a decision and its consequences affects
a person’s choice preferences).
179. See Marold, supra note 178, at 195.
180. Robertson, supra note 6, at 418.
181. Id.
182. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST.
1981). Contracts can also be deemed unenforceable in grounds of violation of public
policy. Petersen, supra note 173, at 1089 (“[T]he Restatement (Second) of Contracts
provides for unenforceability on grounds of public policy, invalidation in accordance
with this provision requires that the public policy interest clearly outweigh[s] the interest in enforcing the contract terms.” (footnote omitted)).
183. See Sandra Kennedy, Note, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Why States Should Adopt
California’s Independent Counsel Requirement for the Enforceability of Prenuptial
Agreements, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 709, 713 (2014).
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Independent Counsel Should Be Required

States should require parties to consult with independent counsel before
a cryopreservation agreement is presumed enforceable. Such a rule would provide, at a minimum, two benefits. First, it would make parties more knowledgeable and aware of their rights at stake. A competent attorney can guide
his or her clients away from potential problems that lead to litigation. Second,
even if a couple makes what some might see as an unfair agreement (e.g.,
awarding frozen embryos to the woman for gestation in the event of divorce),
enforcing the couples’ contract is more justifiable knowing that the parties entered into the contract after consultation with independent counsel.184
Cryopreservation agreements, as with most contracts, can have a plethora
of supplemental clauses, addendums, and technical terms.185 As one observer
notes, “The presentation of the countless forms coupled with the contemplation
of death and divorce in a time of supposed happiness for the parents-to-be,
makes it nearly impossible to form a thoughtful and informed decision about .
. . your embryos . . . in the event one of the contingencies should occur.”186
Given the mix of emotions many experience at this time, each party should be
required to seek counsel so that the serious and long-lasting consequences associated with the disposition of the embryos may be discussed.
Consulting independent counsel has been mandated in other situations,
such as prenuptial agreements.187 Historically, prenuptial agreements were
presumed unenforceable because they were “contrary to the concept of marriage.”188 As the country’s attitude and cultural values shifted, “paternalism
demonstrated by earlier courts has decreased as overall enforceability [of prenuptial agreements] has risen.”189 Although now presumably enforceable, prenuptial agreements still adhere to traditional contract law.190 Agreements are
184. Essential to every contract is a “meeting of the minds,” also known as mutual
assent. See Richard Stim, Contracts: The Basics, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/contracts-basics-33367.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2017). Key to mutual
assent is a shared understanding of essential terms. Id. Consulting an attorney can
ensure that donors understand and accept the key terms to a cryopreservation agreement. See id.
185. Marold, supra note 178, at 195–96.
186. Id. at 196.
187. “A prenuptial agreement (“prenup” for short) is a written contract created by
two people before they are married.” Prenuptial Agreements: Who Needs It and How
Do I Make One?, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/prenuptial-agreements-overview-29569.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2017). “A prenup typically lists all
of the property each person owns (as well as any debts) and specifies what each person’s property rights will be after the marriage.” Id.; see generally Allison A. Marston,
Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887
(1997).
188. Marston, supra note 187, at 897 (“Until 1970, prenuptial agreements providing
for the disposition of assets upon divorce were unenforceable in the United States.”).
189. Id. at 898.
190. Id.
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enforceable only when entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and without duress
or undue influence.191 Nonetheless, some prenuptial agreements are the result
of last-minute decisions, and yet others reveal significant imbalances in the
distribution of assets.192 In light of these increasingly common and unjust outcomes, certain courts have required couples to seek independent counsel before
entering into a prenuptial agreement.193 These courts maintain that couples
entering into prenuptial contracts should be well informed of their rights,
should understand the terms of the contract, and should be assured of the enforceability of their agreement so that future litigation is unlikely.194
Similarly, cryopreservation agreements would benefit from an independent-counsel requirement. Like a prenuptial agreement, frozen embryo contracts deal with parties at a deeply-sensitive time in their lives.195 Further, both
types of contracts – hopefully – reach parties when they are eager and excited
for the future. An independent-counsel requirement would ensure the parties
have contemplated, or are at least knowledgeable of, the legal implications of
their decisions. Current cryopreservation case law is noticeably riddled with
contractual disputes. For example, one agreement provided for embryo disposition in the event of “separation,” but it did not specifically address “divorce.”196 Another couple did not reach an agreement regarding embryo disposition in the case of divorce or separation, or even discuss the issues generally.197 Moreover, one man routinely signed cryopreservation forms in the car
on the way to the fertility clinic before any details had been written down.198
Instead of making rash decisions, an independent-counsel requirement would
encourage “couples [to] make disposition decisions only after careful, compassionate consideration of various circumstances that could arise and alter their
situations.”199
An independent-counsel requirement would benefit parties by allowing
an attorney to anticipate potential legal issues and clarify each member’s rights
at stake. Furthermore, consultation with independent counsel can and should
be a crucial factor in determining whether an apparent waiver of rights should
be enforced. A recurring example in case law features a cryopreservation con-

191. Id. at 909–10.
192. Id. at 912–13; see also Rowland v. Rowland, 599 N.E.2d 315, 316–17 (Ohio

Ct. App. 1991) (finding a prenuptial agreement invalid where a man threatened to
forego marrying his pregnant fiancé, who was not represented by independent counsel,
if she did not waive her rights to alimony and property valued over $150,000.).
193. Kennedy, supra note 182, at 716–17.
194. Id.
195. Petersen, supra note 173, at 1087–88.
196. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1054, 1057 (Mass. 2000).
197. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tenn. 1992).
198. See A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1054.
199. Petersen, supra note 173, at 1088.
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tract empowering a woman to implant frozen embryos should the couple divorce or otherwise separate.200 If such an event occurs and the man no longer
agrees with the contract’s terms, the court is left to decide whether to enforce
the contract and allow the woman to use the frozen embryos against the man’s
wishes. Stated differently, the court must decide whether to force the man to
procreate given the parties’ earlier contract. The rights to procreate and not to
procreate have been considered “a vital part of an individual’s right to privacy”
and deemed “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.”201 But, like most rights, the right not to procreate can be waived
– as in this example, by contract.202 To enforce a waiver of such intimate rights,
courts should require proof that the agreement was entered into voluntarily and
with full knowledge of the affected rights.203 The best way to determine if the
agreement was entered into voluntarily and with adequate knowledge is to examine whether the couple sought independent counsel before signing their
agreement.204
An independent-counsel requirement, although beneficial and important
for multiple reasons, has downsides. A requirement to consult counsel would
undoubtedly add time to the already lengthy process of IVF. Requiring independent counsel for each cryopreservation contract would also increase
costs.205 Legal fees can be a significant burden, especially when coupled with
the costs of cryopreservation and the IVF procedure, which are typically substantial.206 But, legal fees would constitute only a small portion of the total
cost of IVF procedures. Further, as cryopreservation of embryos becomes
more common, fertility clinics should develop standard form contracts to expedite and simplify the process of consulting an attorney, thus decreasing the
associated costs.
For some, adding an independent-counsel requirement does not remedy a
contract’s failure to protect societal interests.207 For example, although prenuptial agreements are presumed enforceable, any designation for child support
is usually not honored due to the court’s and society’s independent interests in
200. See, e.g., Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1149 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015);
see A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059; McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 145 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2016).
201. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599, 600 (second quotation quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
202. Robertson, supra note 6, at 422.
203. Id. at 423 (“With so much hinging on the options chosen, [fertility] programs
should take great care to make sure that the couple is fully aware of the consequences
of their choices and the alternatives foregone.”).
204. C.f. Kennedy, supra note 183, at 710 (demonstrating that in the context of
prenuptial agreements the use of independent counsel has made some courts more
likely to uphold an agreement challenged on voluntariness and knowingness).
205. C.f. Marston, supra note 187, at 893 (showing the high costs of retaining counsel to draft prenuptial agreements).
206. Shields, supra note 80, at 696–709.
207. See Petersen, supra note 173, at 1086.
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a child’s well-being.208 The enforcement of agreements allowing a surrogate
to carry a couple’s child for a fee has also been criticized for commodifying
reproduction in a way that contradicts societal values.209 However, cryopreservation agreements differ from prenuptial and surrogate contracts because
designation of frozen embryo disposition does not deal with an exchange of
money but rather “simply specif[ies] treatment of already created embryos.”210
And while prenuptial and surrogate contracts could be considered commercial
transactions, cryopreservation agreements – when created appropriately – are
considerate of countless contingences and circumstances. Undoubtedly, this is
a complicated, sensitive, and intimate issue that is deeply personal. In such
situations, it may be impossible to honor both parties’ wishes and all of society’s concerns.
Jalesia McQueen and Justin Gadberry signed a cryopreservation contract
but now disagree on most of the important details. Had the couple consulted
an attorney before signing the agreement, it may have been difficult for
McQueen to add a clause to the contract without Gadberry’s knowledge, and it
would be absurd for Gadberry to now claim that he was unaware of a crucial
contractual provision. Indeed, a quick meeting with independent counsel could
have spared the couple from a lengthy, emotional lawsuit and saved the court
from guessing as to the couple’s actual intentions. Unfortunately, it was too
late for McQueen and Gadberry to utilize an independent-counsel requirement,
and their frozen embryos were left at the mercy of the court. But, as a case of
first impression, Missouri now has the opportunity to encourage consultation
with independent counsel so that disputes are less likely to arise, or, if they do,
courts can resolve issues quickly and confidently.

V. CONCLUSION
At the writing of this Note, over 600,000 frozen embryos are in storage
in the United States alone.211 Even if a mere fraction of these embryos produce
a legal dispute, courts will need clear guidance to address the sensitive and
intimate issues at stake. A contractual approach, coupled with a requirement
to consult independent counsel, will ensure that couples entering into a cryopreservation agreement understand the contract, its consequences, and their
rights and potential obligations should death, divorce, or other changes in circumstance occur. Although not a perfect solution, the heightened independentcounsel requirement combined with more traditional rules of contract law will
give courts the clearest path to honoring the parties’ original wishes.

208.
209.
210.
211.

Marston, supra note 187, at 898.
Petersen, supra note 173, at 1086–87.
Id.
See Embryo Adoption, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,
http://www.hhs.gov/opa/about-opa-and-initiatives/embryo-adoption/ (last visited Sept.
8, 2017).
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